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Barbe: Property: Builder-Vendors' Broadened Liability for Selecting an U

CASE NOTES
PROPERTY: Builder-Vendors' Broadened Liability For Selecting an Unsafe
Homesite. Homeowner-Sellers' Duty to Warn. ABC Builders, Inc. v.
Phillips, 632 P.2d 925 (Wyo. 1981).

In May, 1978, a house in Sheridan, Wyoming, owned
by William and Cynthia Phillips, was severely damaged
when a hill located on an adjacent lot slid into the Phillips'
home. The damage was so extensive that only the top floor
was salvageable. In 1979, the Phillips sued ABC Builders,
Inc., which, in 1969, had built the home. The Phillips' cause
of action was based upon the theories of breach of implied
warranty and negligence.' The district court dismissed this
action because it was brought after the statute of limitations
set forth under Section 1-3-111 of the Wyoming Statutes'
had run. On appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court, this
statute was held to be in violation of the Wyoming Constitution and the case was sent back to district court.'
Upon remand, ABC impleaded Kenneth and Virginia
Kaster, Gary and Betty Benson, and the City of Sheridan.
The Kasters were the original owners of the house who
bought it from ABC in 1969. During the time the Kasters
owned the house they added a covered patio and installed
a drain pipe to deposit water from the roof to the lot adjacent to the house. In 1971, the Kasters sold the house to
the Bensons who made no improvements and, in 1977, sold
it to the Phillips. The Kasters and the Bensons moved for
summary judgment on the pleadings. The grant of summary judgment for the Bensons was unopposed, but ABC
objected to summary judgment for the Kasters. The Kasters'
motion was granted by the trial judge in spite of ABC's
objections, because he was "unable to come up with any
theory of liability on their part...
Copyright@ 1982 by the University of Wyoming

1. ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 928 (Wyo. 1981) [hereinafter
cited in text as ABC].
2. This statute, in essence, set a limitation of 10 years after a house is substantially completed within which to bring an action against the architect
or builder for defective construction. Wyo. STAT. § 1-3-111 (1977)
(amended 1981).
3. Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980). See Note,
Statute of Limitations for Architects and Builders as Special Legislation,
16 LAND & WATER L. REV.313 (1981).
4. ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, supra note 1, at 929.
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The action by the Phillips against ABC proceeded to
trial where evidence showed that ABC should have known
at the time it built the house that the hill behind it was
unstable. Evidence further showed that the slide was due
to the combined effects of extensive rainfall, poor upkeep
of a drainage ditch by the City of Sheridan and perhaps
water deposited to the soil by the drain pipe installed by
the Kasters.'
While the Phillips brought the action on both the
theories of implied warranty and negligence, the judge put
the case to the jury on the issue of negligence. The jury
found ABC to have been 80% negligent, the City of Sheridan
15%, the Phillips 5%, and the Kasters 0% negligent in
causing the damage and returned a $40,000 verdict for
the Phillips.6 ABC appealed claiming that the verdict imposing liability on it was in error since the hill which
caused the damage was not located on land owned by it
and that it could not be responsible for the condition of
surrounding property.7 The Wyoming Supreme Court, however, held that the evidence supported the finding that ABC
had reason to know of the unstable nature of the adjacent
hill and affirmed the lower court's finding of negligence.'
In so doing, the court laid down the rule that buildervendors have a duty to furnish safe sites for the homes it
builds.' The court also suggested that liability may be imposed upon builder-vendors for their selection of an unsafe
site on the basis of implied warranty."0 Moreover, the court
went on to hold that a homeowner has a duty upon resale
to warn his buyer of conditions which the seller knows or
should know of and which represent an unreasonable risk
of harm.11
5. Id. at 930.
6. Id. at 928-29. While the Kasters were not parties to the suit, due to the
earlier grant of summary judgment in their favor, their names did appear
on the verdict form. On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court held this to
be in error. Id. at 934.
7. Brief of Appellant ABC Builders, Inc. at 29, ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips,
632 P.2d 925 (Wyo. 1981).
8. ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, supra note 1, at 938.
9. id.
10. Id. at 937.

11. 1d. at 932.
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This note will review the doctrines of caveat emptor
and merger as they apply to the sale of realty and how, in
recent years, their application in the sale of new housing
has been disfavored by many jurisdictions, including Wyoming. A discussion of the ABC 2 decision imposing liability
on builder-vendors for their negligent selection of an unsafe
home site, and the soundness of applying the law of implied
warranty to home sites will be included. In conjunction
with this discussion, some basic differences between negligence and implied warranty and how each may affect
homeowners' recovery or builders' liability will be analyzed.
The focus will then shift to a discussion of the rule adopted
by the ABC court imposing a duty upon homeowner-sellers
to warn buyers of unreasonable risks existing on the premises, and how one might allocate liability between a homeowner-seller held liable for negligence and a builder-vendor
held liable for breach of implied warranty.
CAVEAT EMPTOR AND MERGER

Historically, the doctrines of caveat emptor ("let the
buyer beware") and merger have shielded vendors of realty
from lawsuits by unhappy buyers. The doctrine of caveat
emptor is premised upon the ground that the sale of realty'
is an arms length transaction between the parties involved
and that the buyer is as able as the seller to inspect the
premises and make a determination as to its soundness.
Once the buyer accepts the deed to the land, he is deemed
to have accepted the land "as is" and thus becomes responsible for all defects existing at the time of sale as well
as those which later become manifest. The doctrine of
merger operates to merge all prior negotiations between the
parties into the final written expression of the parties'
intent-the deed. 4 Since the deed rarely contains any express warranties as to the condition of the land or improvements upon the land, the seller is not liable for any defects
in either the land or improvements upon the land. The only
12. ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, eupra note 1.
13. Caveat emptor had its birth in the sale of chattels, but was soon extended
to realty. See Niro, Let the Seller Bewarel Illinois Adopts the Implied
Warranty of Fitness in the Sale of a New Home, 68 ILL. B.J. 770 (1980).
14. See generally 12 AM. JuR. PROOF OF FACTs 2d 108 (1977).
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relief for the buyer was a possible action against the seller
for fraud."6
During the post World War II years the housing
market began to boom and new homes were being built in
a manner likened to mass production. 6 Heavy equipment
cleared large tracts of land upon which extensive home
developments came into being. While caveat emptor had to
a large extent met its death in the sale of personalty, it
remained applicable to the sale of realty. The ironic result
was that a buyer of an inexpensive item of personalty
received significant legal protections through the judicial
and legislative impositions of implied warranties, while the
buyer of a much more expensive item of realty was at his
own peril. 7 Realizing the unjust results of caveat emptor
and merger, many courts began abandoning those doctrines
in favor of implied warranties and actions based in negligence. 8
A major turning point came in 1964 when the Colorado
Supreme Court, in Carpenter v. Donaho,0 held that an
implied warranty of habitability and good workmanship
existed in the sale of a new house. Since that time almost
every other jurisdiction has adopted a similar rule.2" In
1975, Wyoming was given its first opportunity to address
the issue of caveat emptor as it applied to the sale of new
housing.
CAVEAT EMPTOR AND THE SALE OF

NEW HOUSING IN WYOMING

In 1975, in the case of Tavares v. Horstman," the
Wyoming Supreme Court held that the doctrine of caveat
15. See Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of
Real Property,53 GEo. L.J. 633 (1965).
16. Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275, 1279 (Wyo. 1975).
17. See Haskell, supra note 15, at 633.
18. "The significant purchase of a new home leads logically to the buyer's
expectation that he be judicially protected. Any other result would be
intolerable and unjust. . .

."

Tavares v. Horstman, supra note 16, at 1279.

19. 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
20. For a list of jurisdictions applying some form of implied warranty to new
housing, see Note, The Implied Warranty Comes of Age in Illinois New
Housing, 13 J. MAR. 769 (1981).

21. Tavares v. Horstman, supra note 16 [hereinafter cited in text as Tavares].
See Note, PartialDeath of Caveat Emptor in Wyoming, 11 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 633 (1976).
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emptor does not apply in Wyoming to the sale of new
housing by builder-vendors. In Tavares, a builder sold a
tract of land to the plaintiff and subsequently built a house
upon the lot under an oral contract. Within one year the
septic system backed up and deposited sewage in the basement of the house. The builder was unable to remedy the
situation so the plaintiff contacted a septic tank contractor
who determined that the existing system was too small
and installed a larger septic system. The court noted that
builders today hold themselves out as being skilled in home
construction and that buyers should be able to rely on
builders' representations.22 In allowing the plaintiff to recover the cost of the new septic system, the court held that
the sale of a new home by a builder-vendor "carries with
it an implied warranty that it is constructed in a reasonable
workmanlike manner and is fit for habitation."23 The
court also held that a builder-vendor may be held liable
for his negligence in the design and construction of a home.24
Thus, Tavares established that the original buyer of a home
could maintain an action against the builder-vendor upon
the legal theories of negligence and implied warranty.
However, whether the same rights extended to subsequent
owners was an open question until four years later when
the court decided the case of Moxley v. Laramie Builders,
25

Inc.

In Moxley, the plaintiff, who was the second owner of
the house built by the defendant, became aware that the
electrical wiring on the premises was defective and dangerous and as a result had it replaced. The Wyoming
Supreme Court held that subsequent owners could maintain
an action against builder-vendors for defects in the premises, and that the cause of action could lie in either negligence or implied warranty.2 6 Thus, Tavares and Moxley
provided a solid foundation upon which aggrieved homeowners could stand, and at the same time, expanded potential liability for builder-vendors.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Tavares v. Horstman, eupra note 16, at 1279.
Id. at 1282.
Id.
600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979) [hereinafter cited in text as Mozley].
Id. at 736.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1982

5

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 17 [1982], Iss. 2, Art. 5

472

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XVII

THE ABC DECISION

Broadened Builder-Vendor Liability-

"Safe Site"

In Tavares and Moxley, the court established that both
the original and subsequent owners of a home could maintain an action against the builder-vendor for defects in
construction. In ABC,2 however, the Wyoming Supreme
Court went one step further and held that "[p]roviding a
safe site goes like hand and glove with construction."28 The
rule was promulgated, then, that builder-vendors have a
duty "[t]o furnish a safe location for a residential structure and it may be negligence to not do so."" The significance of this holding is that builder-vendors not only may
be liable for defects upon the premises, to both the original
buyer and subsequent owners, but now may also be liable
for damages to the premises which result from forces
originating beyond the boundaries of the lot."0 This is a
broad rule and its application is problematic. The difficulties seem to lie in determining exactly what conditions
a builder-vendor must avoid.
For example, assume that a builder constructs a home
at the foot of a hill which has a winding road above it.
Assume further that the builder knows that several cars
have missed a turn on the road and have ended up on the
proposed home site. This could arguably be an unsafe site.
For the homeowner it is difficult to distinguish between
the damage caused by the hill sliding into the house and
that caused by the car sliding into the house. In either
event he has been damaged. Would this builder, under the
ABC rule, be liable? Perhaps the answer lies in the court's
reasoning in regard to the caveat emptor question in
Wyoming.
In Tavares, one of the reasons given by the Wyoming
Supreme Court for refusing to apply caveat emptor to the
sale of new housing was that builders today hold themselves
out as being skilled in home construction and that buyers
27.
28.
29.
30.

ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, supra note 1.
Id. at 935.
Id. at 938.
Id.
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should be able to rely on those representations." Thus, the
ABC "safe site" rule could be read, in light of Tavares, as
imposing a duty upon builder-vendors to avoid home sites
which they should know, due to their skill, are unsafe. Put
another way, the scope of the builder-vendors' duty to provide a safe site is related to those things for which a buyer
would normally be expected to rely upon the skilled builder.
The ability to determine the safeness of the ground surrounding a home, or the ground upon which it will be built,
is an ability peculiar to builders, whereas a determination
that a home may be damaged by an auto tumbling from
the hill above is one which any lay-person could make by
mere observance. Thus, in the "runaway car" example,
since the builder is not in a better position due to his skill
to realize the unsafe condition of the site, perhaps he will
not be liable. While such a reading of ABC appears to have
some merit, other language in the ABC decision may be
read as directing a different result. Before adopting the
"safe site" rule, the ABC court reviewed the definition of
negligence32 adopted by the Wyoming Supreme Court in
Endresen v. Allen."
In Endresen, the court approved the following definition of negligence:
The broad test of negligence is what a reasonably
prudent person would foresee and would do in light
of this foresight under the circumstances. Negligence is clearly relative in reference to the knowledge of the risk of injury to be apprehended ....
The most common test of negligence, therefore, is
whether the consequences of the alleged wrongful
act were reasonably to be foreseen as injurious to
others coming within the range of such acts."
Arguing from this language, the builder-vendor's liability
for damage resulting from his negligent selection of an
unsafe site could depend not on whether the damage resulted from conditions which the builder-vendor should
31.
32.
33.
34.

Tavares v. Horstman, supra note 16, at 1279.
ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 8upra note 1, at 937.
574 P.2d 1219 (Wyo. 1978).
Id. at 1221 (quoting 57 AM. JuI. 2d Negligence § 58, at 408-09 (1971)).
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realize, due to his expertise, as unsafe; rather the ultimate
determination of liability might depend simply on the
foreseeability of damage resulting from the site selected.
Under this interpretation, the builder in the "runaway car"
example may be liable. There, the builder is aware of an
unsafe condition and should reasonably foresee the possibility of damage from that condition. Under the Endresen
test, the builder's liability would depend upon whether a
reasonably prudent person, given the foresight of damage
from a runaway car, would have built a home in this location. If a reasonably prudent person would have built a
home in this location, then the builder would not be liable.
If, on the other hand, a reasonably prudent person would
not have built a home in this location, then the builder may
be liable. Of course, the likelihood that a buyer should
realize the danger after a reasonable inspection of the premises will have some bearing on the builder's liability.
A further question left unanswered by the ABC decision is whether the builder-vendor's duty is merely to
avoid a site which he should know is unsafe, or whether
he has an active duty to inspect the site for dangers. In
ABC, the builder was held to have had knowledge, due to
soil tests performed on surrounding property, that the hill
adjacent to the home was unstable." But, assuming the
soil tests had never been performed, would the builder have
been liable for his failure to inspect the site? The ABC
holding was that builder-vendors have a duty to "furnish
a safe location for a residential structure ...
" The word
"furnish," in general, means to supply or provide. 7 This
seems to impose an active duty upon builder-vendors to search
for conditions posing a danger to the site. If this is a correct
interpretation of the "safe site" rule, then the question
becomes: What conditions does the builder-vendor have a
duty to search for? Would the builder in the "runaway car"
example have a duty to inquire as to whether any cars had
missed the turn on the hill if he was not aware of such
occurrences?
35. ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, supra note 1, at 938.
36. Id.
37. BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY 608 (rev. Sth ed. 1979).
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It seems that the builder-vendor's duty to inspect
should be limited to those things which a builder-vendor
would ordinarily anticipate as possible sources of danger,
such as the soil upon and surrounding the site. To hold the
builder-vendor liable for his failure to discover dangers
which he could not reasonably be expected to anticipate
would be to make him an insurer. Thus, perhaps the builder
in the "runaway car" example would not be liable for his
failure to inquire as to whether any cars had missed the
turn on the hill above the home site because this is not the
sort of danger which an ordinary builder would anticipate,
but would be liable for his failure to inspect the stability
of the hill itself.
It appears that the ABC "safe site" rule may be read
as imposing two separate duties upon builder-vendors-a
duty to avoid conditions which are foreseeable sources of
danger, 8 and a duty to inspect the site for conditions which
the ordinary builder-vendor would anticipate as possible
sources of danger. 9 Exactly how the "safe site" rule will
be interpreted by the courts is not clear. Whatever the
application, though, it seems clear that ABC has broadened
builder-vendor liability beyond the limits of Tavares and
Moxley. Yet, there remains a question as to whether liability
may be imposed only upon a finding of negligence or
whether the law of implied warranty may also provide a
basis for recovery.
38. Under the first duty imposed by the safe site rule, the test of the buildervendor's negligence would be whether he has foreseen the danger, and
whether a reasonably prudent person, given this foresight, would have
built a home in that location. If the danger is one which is discoverable
by a reasonable inspection by the buyer, however, then the builder should
not be liable. Caveat emptor assumes that the buyer is as able as the seller
to discover defects in the premises. Where this is in fact the situation, the
doctrine of caveat emptor should remain fully applicable. See supra the
discussion of caveat emptor in the text accompanying notes 13-20.
39. The application of the second duty is problematic. The court stated that
builder-vendors may be liable for damages resulting from forces originating
beyond the boundaries of the lot. ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, supra
note 1, at 938. Thus, it seems that the duty to inspect would also extend
beyond the lot boundaries. The problem, then, is to determine how far
beyond the lot boundaries the builder-vendor must inspect, and whether he
may inspect the surrounding property not owned by him without becoming
a trespasser. These questions will undoubtedly be answered in the future
on a case-by-case basis, however, a more desirable resolution would be a
legislative enactment setting forth the limits of the builder-vendor's duty
to inspect. This would provide more predictability for builder-vendors and
homeowners as to the liabilities and protections that each may expect.
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Negligence or Implied Warranty?

The ABC decision made it clear that a builder-vendor
could be held liable for his negligence in selecting an unsafe
site and suggests that liability may also be imposed upon
the basis of implied warranty." Other jurisdictions have
dealt with cases where damage to the structure has resulted
from defects in the site and have based liability on both
negligence and implied warranty.4 ' The Oregon Supreme
Court has made a very well reasoned analysis as to when
the law of negligence and the law of implied warranty
should apply to defects in realty in the cases of Cook v.
Salishan Properties,Inc.42 and Beri, Inc. v. Salishan Properties, Inc." A review of these cases may, therefore, be of
some value.
Cook and Beri involved a professional land developer
who leased seaside land to persons for a term of 99 years.
As time passed erosion began destroying the lots, whereupon
several of the lessees sued the developer for damages on the
theories of negligence and implied warranty.
The Oregon Supreme Court held that while an implied
warranty of workmanlike construction and fitness for habitation existed in the sale of new housing by builder-vendors,
an implied warranty should not extend to cover "conditions
of the associated land which are not caused by the builderseller's work on the land."44 The court recognized that
buyers of land from commercial developers can justifiably
expect that the land has been chosen for development with
reasonable care, but to expect the land to be free from all
40. ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, supra note 1, at 937. Although the Phillips
sued ABC Builders on both negligence and breach of implied warranty, the
trial judge put the case to the jury only on the theory of negligence. ABC
Builders appealed the finding against them claiming that the finding of
negligence by them was wrong. The Phillips cross appealed arguing that
even if the court reversed on the issue of negligence it should still hold
ABC liable upon the theory of implied warranty. The Wyoming Supreme
Court, however, affirmed the finding of negligence and, therefore, did not
reach the question of implied warranty. The court did note, however, that
"[i]t appears . . . there are two different directions to go in pursuing a
developer-builder of new homes for sale by reason of his selection and
transfer of a dangerous building site: Implied warranty and negligence.
•..."
Id.
41. See cases cited id. at 935-37.
42. 279 Or. 333, 569 P.2d 1033 (1977).
43. 282 Or. 569, 580 P.2d 173 (1978).
44. Id., 580 P.2d at 175-76.
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defects, "including those which could not reasonably have
been discovered prior to the sale,"' .5 is not justified. Thus,
the court refused to impose an implied warranty because
the defect was due to the "inherent nature of the land
involved in the transaction; it is in no sense the product
of defendants' work on the land.""' The court did hold,
however, that the developer could be liable for failing to
take reasonable precautions to determine whether the lots
he offers are fit.' Although Cook and Beri concerned land
developers, rather than builder-vendors, the reasoning of
the cases is sound.
The law of implied warranty imposes liability without
a showing of fault.,8 It seems, therefore, that an important
consideration affecting the decision to impose an implied
warranty should be whether the seller has a better opportunity than the buyer to assure the soundness of that to
which the warranty applies. When a builder constructs a
home he has an opportunity to check that each board and
nail is in place and so is in a better position than the buyer
to prevent a defect. Thus, the imposition of an implied
warranty to construction is proper. The land surrounding
and upon which a home is built, on the other hand, is
normally not the product of the builder's work and he does
not stand in any better position than the buyer to protect
against a defect. Thus, the imposition of an implied warranty may not be proper. The builder is, however, in a
better position to make reasonable inquiries into the condition of the site before he builds and perhaps should be
liable for his failure to do so.
Thus, while the ABC decision suggested that a cause
of action against a builder-vendor for damages caused by
an unsafe site may lie in negligence or implied warranty,
the availability of implied warranty as a basis for recovery should depend on whether the defect is a product of
the builder-vendor's work upon the land. For example,
45.
46.
47.
48.

Cook v. Salishan Properties, Inc., 569 P.2d at 1035.
Beri, Inc. v. Salishan Properties, Inc., 580 P.2d at 175.
Id. at 177.
8 S. WiLLSToN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 991, at 587 (3d
ed. 1964).
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where damage results from settling of land filled by the
builder-vendor, an action based on implied warranty seems
proper since the builder, being the one who filled the land,
was in the best position to assure that it was properly compacted. On the other hand, where damage results from
the "inherent nature of the land [and] is in no sense the
product of [the builder's] work on the land,"4 the builder
should be liable only if he was negligent in failing to realize
the unsafe condition.
The imposition of an implied warranty assumes the
buyer's justified reliance on the seller. 0 Where a builder
has performed work on the land the buyer may justifiably
expect that the work has been done in a reasonable and
workmanlike manner, and an implied warranty is proper.
Where, however, the builder has merely picked the site, the
buyer cannot reasonably expect the land to be free from all
defects, "including those which could not have been discovered prior to the sale."'" In this situation, the most the
buyer can expect is that the builder-vendor has used reasonable care in selecting a safe site. So, while the law of
implied warranty may be applicable to the "safe site" rule
set forth in ABC, its application should be limited to those
situations where the defect is a product of the builder's
work on the land. It is important whether an action will
lie in negligence or implied warranty because the rights
and liabilities of homeowners and builders may be different
under each.
Implied Warranty and Negligence ferences

Some Important Dif-

There are some basic differences between the theories
of negligence and implied warranty which may affect a
builder-vendor's liability or a homeowner's ability to recover.
An obvious difference, and perhaps the most important difference to both homeowners and builders, is that recovery
for breach of implied warranty does not require a showing
49. Beri, Inc. v. Salishan Properties, Inc., 580 P.2d at 175.
50. 8 S. WILLISTON, supra note 48, § 988, at 551.
51. Cook v. Salishan Properties, Inc., 569 P.2d at 1035.
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of fault.5" To recover for negligence, on the other hand, the
homeowner must show that the builder-vendor failed to
exercise reasonable care. Homeowners, therefore, will have
an easier burden of proof when attempting to recover on
the theory of implied warranty.
The damages recoverable may also differ depending on
whether the action is based on implied warranty or negligence. Generally, in contract 4 only the damages which are
reasonably within the contemplation of the parties at the
time of entering the contract are recoverable, 5 while in
tort, the question of recoverability is one of proximate
cause.5 " Thus, a homeowner may be able to recover some
damages for negligence which he could not recover in an
action based on breach of implied warranty."
Another important difference between negligence and
implied warranty is the possible effects of the statute of
limitations as a bar to recovery. Normally, the length of
the statute of limitations and the time at which it begins
to run is different for tort and contract actions. In tort,
the statute generally begins to run at the time the damage
occurs or is discovered, 8 while in contract, the statute normally begins to run at the time of the breach." Therefore,
where the dangerous condition is not discovered for many
years after the house is built, the cause of action on implied
warranty may have run and only a cause of action for
negligence would remain. This is an especially likely situa52. 8 S. WILLISTON, supra note 48, § 991, at 587.
53. "The burden of proving negligence of another is upon him asserting it."
Tavares v. HIorstman, supra note 16, at 1278.
54. There is some debate as to whether implied warranty is a contract or a
tort theory. For the purposes of this discussion, it is assumed to be a
contract theory and therefore subject to general contract law.
55. See generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 14-5 (2d ed. 1977).
56. See generally 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 80, at 115 (1965).
57. It should be noted that whether in contract or tort, the doctrine of avoidable consequences generally applies so that homeowners will not be able
to recover for any damages which they could have avoided. See generally
11 S. WILLISTON, eupra note 48, § 1353; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 918 (1979).
58. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 144-45 (4th ed. 1971).
59. Some jurisdictions have held that an implied warranty is breached, if at
all, at the time of sale, while others hold that the statute does not begin
to run on implied warranty until the breach is discovered. See 18 S.
WILLISTON, upra note 48, § 2021A, at 697, § 2025C, at 781-82.
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tion where subsequent homeowners are bringing an action
for damages.
Wyoming currently has a statute which bars actions
against builders not initiated within 10 years after the
structure is substantially completed, whether the action is
based in negligence or implied warranty." Therefore, a
distinction between negligence and implied warranty may
not be important in Wyoming as affecting the limitation
of actions against builders-vendors. An earlier version of
this statute, however, was declared unconstitutional by the
Wyoming Supreme Court, in the case of Phillips v. ABC
Builders, Inc., as violating the equal protection clause under
the Wyoming Constitution. 1 After Phillips, the Wyoming
legislature attempted to correct the defective language and
reenacted it in 1981, but the constitutionality of this new
statute has not yet been tested. Because of this uncertainty,
it is questionable whether builders-vendors should rely on
W.S. § 1-3-111 as a limitation to actions for selection of
an unsafe site.
Duty of Homeowners Upon Resale
The ABC decision, in addition to laying down the new
"safe site" rule with respect to builder-vendors, also adopted
a new rule imposing liability upon homeowner-sellers
under certain circumstances. In ABC, the builder appealed
the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the Kasters
(who originally purchased the house from ABC Builders
and installed a patio and drain pipe before selling to the
Bensons, who subsequently sold to the Phillips), arguing
that builders should be held liable only for the damages
caused by their negligence and not for the ultimate damage
caused by modifications to the structure or lot.6" In resolving the issue in favor of the Kasters, the ABC court adopted
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 353 as the applicable

rule. 3 The court went on to note: "There is no showing ...
WYO.STAT. § 1-3-111 (Supp. 1981).
61. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
62. Appellant's Reply Brief to Brief of Kenneth R. Kaster and Virginia R.
Kaster at 5, ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925 (Wyo. 1981).
60.

63. ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, supra note 1, at 932.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 353 (1965) provides:
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that the Kasters concealed or failed to disclose . . a condition of which they knew or should have reason to know
which constituted an unreasonable risk underlying the land
from the patio drain... ,"64 and held that "on the applica-

tion of § 353 .

we can find no violation of a duty by the

Kasters ... ."" No explanation, however, was given as to

how § 353 might be applied beyond the limits of this case."
A finding of negligence under § 353 seems to require
the occurrence of three events; first, that the seller know
or should have reason to know of a condition threatening
the premises; second, that the condition involve an unreasonable risk; and third, that the seller fail to warn his buyer
of the condition. The key to determining a seller's negligence under § 353 seems to lie in the second requirement
that the condition involve an unreasonable risk. If the condition involves less than an unreasonable risk, § 353 appears
not to impose a duty on the seller to warn. The problem, of
course, lies in determining what conditions will constitute
an unreasonable risk. Does the condition have to threaten
(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any
condition, whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable
risk to persons on the land, is subject to liability to the vendee and
others upon the land with the consent of the vendee or his subvendee
for physical harm caused by the condition after the vendee has taken
possession, if
(a) the vendee does not know or have reason to know of the condition
or the risk involved, and
(b) the vendor knows or has reason to know of the condition, and
realizes or should realize the risk involved, and has reason to
believe that the vendee will not discover the condition or realize
the risk.
(2) If the vendor actively conceals the condition, the liability stated in
Subsection (1) continues until the vendee discovers it and has reasonable opportunity to take effective precautions against it. Otherwise the
liability continues only until the vendee has had reasonable opportunity to discover the condition and to take such precautions.
64. ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, supra note 1, at 933.
65. Id.
66. Section 353 seems to limit a vendor's liability to physical harm suffered by
persons on the premises, rather than physical harm suffered by property
upon the premises. Section 7 of the Restatement (Second) Torts defines
"physical harm" to include both personal and property damage. However,
in conjunction with the words "any condition . . . which involves unreasonable risk to persons on the land," it appears that physical harm was intended here by the Restatement authors to denote personal injury. Furthermore, comment (f) to § 353 states that "[u]nder the rule stated in this
section a vendor who conceals a dangerous condition existing on land having
no reason to believe that the vendee will discover it is subject to liability
for bodily harm....." In spite of this language, the Illinois Supreme Court,
in Century Display v. D.R. Wager Construction, 71 Ill. 2d 428, 376 N.E.2d
993 (1978), held that § 353 applies to both personal and property damage.
This, it appears, was also the intended application of the ABC court.
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the soundness of the structure or merely be a threat of
some possible damage." The word "unreasonable" seems to
require something more than a mere threat of some possible
damage.
Section 353 has generally been applied by the courts
to conditions on land which involve an unreasonable risk of
bodily harm." Thus, there is little case law defining the
conditions which will constitute an unreasonable risk of
property damage. One trial court in Nevada, however, in a
case involving flood damage sustained by a home built on
the flood plain of a nearby stream, did give a jury instruction likened to § 353. In that instruction, unreasonable risk
was defined as follows: "A lot is unreasonably dangerous
if it is dangerous to an extent beyond that which would
be contemplated by the ordinary purchaser who purchases
it, with ordinary knowledge common to the community as
to it [sic] characteristics.""0 This definition suggests that
an unreasonable risk involves a condition threatening the
structural soundness of the home, or damage which the
ordinary purchaser would not contemplate.
Since most homeowner-sellers are probably not experienced in the field of construction, it is likely that they
may discover a defect but reasonably fail to realize the
risks it poses. Therefore, if unreasonable risk is interpreted
to mean a threat to the structural soundness of the home,
most homeowner-sellers will probably not be affected by
§ 353. If the definition of unreasonable risk is broadened
67. In other words, would § 353 impose a duty upon a homeowner-seller who
is aware that water is leaking through the home's foundation into the
basement, but not aware that the water has weakened the foundation to
the point of collapsing? The homeowner-seller in this situation knows that
a condition exists which threatens some possible damage (i.e., water damage to rugs, etc. in the basement), but is not aware that the condition
threatens the structural soundness of the home. It is possible that a negligent party will be liable for all damages which proximately result from
his negligence, whether or not the damages were foreseeable by him. See
generally W. PROSSER, supra note 58, § 43. Therefore, if the homeownerseller is held to be negligent for failing to warn the buyer that water is
seeping into the basement, he could be liable for the entire damage suffered
from the collapsing foundation, even though he did not foresee such damage. Since the key to a finding of negligence under § 353 is that the
condition involves an unreasonable risk, the definition of unreasonable risk
is important.
68. See generally the cases listed in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 353 appendix (1966).
69. Village Development Co. v. Filice, 90 Nev. 305, 526 P.2d 83, 88 n.6 (1974).
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to include risks threatening less than the structural soundness of the home, more homeowner-sellers will likely be
affected."0
The adoption of § 353 in ABC makes it clear that a
homeowner who sustains damage may have a cause of
action against both the builder-vendor and previous owners.
Builder-vendors may be liable upon the theories of implied
warranty and negligence with respect to defects in the
structure"' or dangers existing in the site."2 Previous homeowners, on the other hand, may be liable for negligence
under § 353. Thus, a suit against both the builder-vendor
and previous homeowners could involve a combination of
implied warranty and negligence.
Causes of Action Combining Implied Warranty and Negligence
The ABC court pointed out the possibility of confusion
in allocating liability when the builder-vendor is being
sued on implied warranty and prior owners are being sued
for negligence under § 353.3 The law of implied warranty
allows a plaintiff to recover damages without showing
fault. 4 To recover for negligence, on the other hand, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant was at fault in
causing the damage. 5 Thus, where a builder-vendor is held
liable for breach of implied warranty and a homeownerseller is held liable for negligence under § 353, there is a
question as to how one should allocate the liability between
the defendants for the purpose of determining comparative
fault.
The best solution may be to allocate liability as though
all defendants are being sued in negligence and treat them
as joint tortfeasors. This plan would not adversely affect
70. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
71. Tavares v. Horstman, supra note 16; Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc.,
supra note 25.
72. ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, supra note 1. Although ABC did not actually
hold that an implied warranty of safe site exists in Wyoming, the court
did suggest that an action based on implied warranty may be maintained.
Id. at 937.
73. Id.
74. 8 S. WILLSTON, aupra note 48, § 991, at 587.
75. Tavares v. Horstman, supra note 16, at 1278.
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the plaintiff's recovery."6 In fact, it may even better his
position because generally, joint tortfeasors are jointly and
severably liable.77 Further, treating the defendants as joint
tortfeasors would be more equitable for them because they
could then have a right of contribution under the Wyoming
Statutes. 8
This scheme could be implemented by requiring the
jury to return a special verdict form setting forth its determination of the percentage of damages caused by the prior
owners' negligence.79 Thus, the builder-vendor would have
a right of contribution from the prior negligent homeowners
for the percentage of damages ascribed to them and the
negligent homeowners would, conversely, have a right of
contribution from the builder-vendor for the amount of
damages not attributable to their negligence.8"
CONCLUSION

The holding in ABC has broadened builder-vendor
liability to a greater extent than any prior Wyoming case.
Builder-vendors now may be liable for the selection of an
unsafe site which means that they could be responsible for
damage resulting from conditions originating beyond the
boundaries of the lot. However, exactly which conditions
the builder-vendor will be liable for is not clear. The
ABC decision also established that the law of negligence
applies to the selection of an unsafe site but leaves a question as to whether the law of implied warranty will also
apply. While an absolute application of implied warranty
76. Treating the defendants as joint tortfeasors for the purpose of determining
comparative fault will not affect the plaintiff's burden of proof as to the
builder. The plaintiff could still impose liability upon the builder when
suing for breach of implied warranty by merely showing that a breach
has occurred. The only effect of treating all of the defendants as joint
tortfeasors would be to allow a right of contribution among them for damages caused by each other.
77. Comment, Wyoming Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 9 LAND &
WATEn L. REv. 589, 594 (1974). See also WYo. STAT. § 1-1-110(h) (1977).
78. See WYO. STAT. § 1-1-110 (1977).
79. Determining the percentage of damage caused by a negligent homeowner
may, however, be a difficult task for a jury. For example, how does one
measure the amount of damage caused by a mere failure to warn?
80. There is some debate as to whether implied warranty is a tort or contract
theory. See W. PROSSER, supra note 58, § 95, at 635-38. Therefore treating
implied warranty as a tort theory for the purposes of determining comparative fault is not an inconsistent application of implied warranty.
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to the site does not seem proper, where the defect in the
site is a product of the builder-vendor's work on the land,
implied warranty may be applicable.
The ABC court also adopted § 353 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which imposes a duty upon homeowners
who sell their homes to warn their buyers of unreasonable
risks of harm which they know or should know exist. The
court failed to explain, however, how this rule is to be
applied beyond the limits of that case. It seems that the
rule imposes a duty to warn only of risks which threaten
harm not contemplated by the ordinary homebuyer. If this
is the interpretation given by the Wyoming courts, then
§ 353 will probably have little impact upon the liability
of homeowner-sellers since most homeowner-sellers are probably not experienced in construction and will, therefore,
fail to realize the risks posed by defects of which they are
aware.
JAMES K. BARBE
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